Mismatch between seriousness of allegations and time taken to investigate them

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Ed Madden , 2025-05-09 07:30:00

Ed Madden, BL, looks at a recent England and Wales High Court case in which the Court examined the reasons for delays on the part of the General Medical Council in concluding an investigation into allegations made against a registered medical practitioner

On January 28, 2025, the England and Wales High Court delivered its judgment in a case in which the General Medical Council (‘the GMC’) sought an extension of an interim order imposed by an Interim Orders Tribunal on the registration of psychiatrist Dr Rajesh Ragu Jain. The extension sought was for 12 months up to and including December 8, 2025. The GMC had been investigating concerns that Dr Jain’s fitness to practise might be impaired by reason of alleged misconduct and ill health.

Before hearing argument on the substance of the application, the Court dealt with a request from the doctor that the presiding judge, Mr Justice Kerr, should recuse himself from hearing the case. This request was first made by application in writing the night before the hearing and was made again orally the following morning.

It transpired that in July 2019, Mr Justice Kerr had delivered a judgment in respect of Dr Jain and that in light of that judgment the doctor now questioned the appropriateness of him presiding in respect of the current application. The judge said it was ‘fundamental to our system of justice that litigants are entitled to a fair and impartial tribunal’. If on the other hand grounds for removing the judge are not made out, it is wrong for a party without good cause, to be able to remove a judge from hearing a case.

The judge robustly refuted arguments advanced by the doctor in support of recusal. He would not accept that a fair minded and informed observer, having considered the facts, would conclude that there was a real possibility that the Court would not act fairly to both parties. He then proceeded to deal with the GMC application.

The Court heard that in July 2022, Dr Jain was alleged to have spoken inappropriately to a female doctor ‘in a manner that could be described as sexual harassment, though not involving any touching’.

On January 25, 2023, the GMC received a complaint from a patient referred to as ‘EC’. She had seen Dr Jain the previous day for a mental health assessment. Her complaint alleged that he made her feel ‘very uncomfortable’ and that she regarded his conduct of the sessions as ‘incredibly unprofessional’.

In April 2023, the GMC received a report from Powys Health Board in Wales that Dr Jain had been acting as a clinician there ‘without having formal Welsh approved clinician status’ and that the health board had terminated his contract.

On October 7, 2024, Dr Jain referred himself to the GMC having unwisely, as he accepted, taken his then 17-year-old son to observe a mental health assessment. Subsequent to that episode, the Interim Orders Tribunal decided to suspend the doctor from practising medicine.

Having considered evidence from counsel for the GMC and from Dr Jain, who was not legally represented, Mr Justice Kerr gave his decision on the application for an extension of the interim order. Dealing with the gravity of the allegations, the judge said that while they were not trivial, neither were they of the utmost seriousness.

It was not suggested that the life of any patient had been put at risk, or that the wellbeing of any patient, with the exception of EC, had been adversely affected. As to a question of competence, it was alleged that in a 20-year career Dr Jain had conducted an incompetent medical consultation on one occasion (almost two years previously).

Dealing with the potential risk to patients or to the public interest if Dr Jain were permitted to practise, there was a strong public interest in doctors obeying the rules, conducting medicine in a competent manner and abiding by any relevant conditions. However, there was also a strong public interest against deskilling of doctors and thereby depriving the public of their services.

Having enquired into the reasons for the proposed extension of time, the judge said the main reason was that the GMC’s system of disciplining doctors ‘was not geared to swift resolution of disciplinary issues’. He referred to a culture of delay and tolerance of delay. The GMC had much of the evidence concerning Dr Jain since June 2023.

They now wished to prevent him from working as a doctor until the end of 2025, which was about three and a half years after the first incident complained of.  In the interim, the GMC had devoted much time and effort to the interim orders tribunal process and applications to the High Court; and little effort into convening a hearing, if indeed one was necessary.

The function of the Court was to ascertain whether the allegations made (rather than their truth or falsity), justified prolonging the interim order. The onus of satisfying the Court that the criteria for extending the interim measures were met was a matter for the GMC. They had not discharged that onus. There was a mismatch between the seriousness of the allegations and the time taken to investigate them.

The judge said it was unacceptable to deprive Dr Jain of his right to earn a living for a further year in a situation where no wrongdoing had been proved against him. Even at this late stage, the GMC was unable to give a timescale for the making of a decision as to whether or not the matter would proceed to a disciplinary hearing. It had already been accepted that some of the alleged incidents might be dealt with by way of a warning.

The Court accepted Dr Jain’s submission that it was not in the public interest for him to become deskilled. Rather, it was in the public interest that his services should be available to his patients.

The Court went on to dismiss the application for an extension of the interim order.

Reference: [2025] EWHC 733 (Admin)

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